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 In recent years, Thailand has faced a real challenge of sustaining its growth and 
escaping from its middle income trap (World Bank Office -Thailand, 2008). For Thailand to 
transition to higher income and quality growth in the long term, measures to improve 
productivity and competitiveness over the long term in all sectors (agriculture, industry, and 
services) are urgently needed. The manufacturing sector has been one of the most important 
sectors in the East and Southeast Asian countries. Economic growth in this region since the 
early 1980s has arisen primarily from the rapid expansion in manufacturing exports 
(Jongwanich, 2007). Moreover, the major problems causing firm-level inefficiency could be 
obviously observed from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The Crisis highlighted problems of 
lack of transparency in corporate governance and a corrupt and mismanaged banking system 
(i.e., excessive lending to non-productive assets, lack of adequate debt monitoring) among the 
crisis-affected countries in South East Asia as well as Thailand.  
The problem of weak corporate governance was related to, for example, the 
dominance of controlling shareholders, the separation of voting and cash flow rights (or the 
disparity between control and ownership), and the limited protection of minority rights 
(Claessens et al., 2000). Not only the inefficient environmental factors discussed above 
caused manufacturing inefficiency in Thailand but firm-specific factors (i.e., inadequate firm 
size, lack of business experience, lack of research and development (R&D) investment, 
inefficient managerial skills, lack of internal competition, and lack of external competition or 
lack of learning-by-exporting experience) also affected the inefficiency performance of Thai 
listed manufacturing firms. After the 1997 Asian financial crisis the corporate governance 
system was strengthened in Thai capital markets, such as through enhancing the institutional 
framework for accounting and auditing practices, improving the disclosure practice of listed 
companies, encouraging best practices for directors of listed companies, and relaxing foreign 
ownership controls (East Asia Analytical Unit, 2000, Talerngsri and Vonkhorporn, 2005, 
Sally, 2007). However, these environmental and firm-specific factors that affect firm 
inefficiency have not been empirically examined for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises. 
This paper aims to fill this gap, and is organized as follows: Section II provides a review of 
the literature. Sector III describes data sources and data classification. Section IV presents 





data envelopment analysis (DEA) approaches. Hypothesis tests are analysed in Section V. 
The empirical results of both approaches are provided and discussed in Section VI. Some 
conclusions and implications are also provided in the final section.  
II. Literature Review  
Very few empirical studies have examined the effect of leverage (financial 
constraints) on a firm’s technical efficiency (Dilling-Hansen et al., 2003, Sena, 2006, Mok et 
al., 2007, Weill, 2008). Sena (2006) and Mok et al. (2007) used the leverage ratio represented 
by the ratio of total debt to total assets (the D/A ratio) to investigate the effect of financial 
constraints on firm technical efficiency. This debt ratio captures how much a firm is 
constrained in its expansion. Their empirical results revealed that firms with high leverage 
tend to experience a decrease in their technical efficiency. This was confirmed by Goldar et 
al. (2003) who applied the quick ratio current assets inventory /current liabilities  to 
examine the importance of the liquidity of Indian engineering firms on their technical 
efficiency, and found that liquidity has a significantly negative effect on firm technical 
efficiency.  There are a number of theoretical studies focusing on the relative efficiency of 
internal versus external financing (Jensen, 1986, Gertner et al., 1994, Stein, 1997), the 
conclusions from which are still controversial. Gertner et al. (1994) and Stein (1997) 
supported that a firm’s capital is allocated more efficiently through internal rather than 
external financial resources, since internal financing can increase monitoring incentives, 
decrease entrepreneurial incentives, and result in better asset allocation. However, Jensen 
(1986) argued that internal financing causes an agency problem, since managers have the 
opportunity to abuse internal funds, and they can easily mobilize internal funds to maximize 
their own interests and lack the desire or necessity to maximize shareholders’ interests due to 
the lack of external monitoring from banks or financial institutions. Empirical studies have 
also revealed inconclusive results. For example, Gökçekus (1995) found no significant effects 
of the relative efficiency of internal versus external financial resources on a firm’s technical 
efficiency for the Turkish rubber industry. Kim (2003) used the ratio of total interest 
payments on borrowed capital to total capital as a proxy for external financing. He found that 
this has a positive effect on a firm’s technical efficiency. Focusing on research and 
development (R&D) a number of empirical studies have found that R&D has a positive effect 






Sheu and Yang, 2005). Kim (2003) found that the ratio of R&D spending to total output has a 
significant positive association with a firm’s technical efficiency for the textile and chemical 
industries, but such a relationship was not found in the fabrication industry. Sheu and Yang 
(2005) also found that R&D, as measured by annual R&D expenditure deflated by the 
general Wholesale Price Index (WPI), positively influences technical efficiency in Taiwan’s 
electronics industry.  
Ownership structure is also one of the important firm-specific factors affecting a 
firm’s performance. A number of empirical studies have examined the effect of controlling 
ownership on a firm’s performance based on accounting or financial measures (Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985, McConnell and Servaes, 1990, Leech and Leahy, 1991, Wiwattanakantang, 
2001, Yammeesri and Lodh, 2003, Zeitun and Tian, 2007), but their empirical results are still 
inconclusive. There are both costs and benefits associated with controlling ownership. The 
presence of controlling ownerships (shareholders with large stakes) can deteriorate firm 
performance, since the interest of controlling shareholders may not align with those of non-
controlling shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, Bebchuk et al., 1999). There is a 
possibility that large shareholders may conduct corrupt activities. On the other hand, 
according to agency theory, controlling shareholders are likely to perform better than 
dispersed shareholders, since a high level of ownership concentration can reduce agency 
costs. In the case of Thailand, Wiwanttanakantang (2001) and Yammeesri and Lodh (2003) 
found that controlling ownership is positively associated with a firm’s performance, as 
evaluated by accounting or financial measures.  
Similarly, managerial ownership1 can help align the conflict of interests between 
shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). If managers’ interests coincide 
more closely with those of shareholders, the conflicts between managers and shareholders are 
alleviated. Very few empirical studies have examined the effect of managerial ownership on a 
firm’s technical efficiency (see Liao et al. (2010)). Liao et al. (2010) calculated the 
percentage of equity owned by managers and the percentage of equity owned by the board, 
and examined the effects of these variables on a firm’s technical efficiency as measured by a 
two-stage DEA. Their results found that managerial and board equities are positively related 
with a firm’s technical efficiency, but their results are not statistically significant. In addition, 
 





very few empirical studies examined the effect of executive remuneration on a firm’s 
technical efficiency. Baek and Pagán (2003) conducted a stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to 
measure a firm’s technical efficiency, and found that the level of CEO total compensation is 
positively associated with a firm’s technical efficiency for S&P 1,500 firms. 
Focusing upon different types of firm ownership a number of empirical studies have 
also found a positive association between foreign ownership and technical efficiency 
(Fukuyama et al., 1999, Goldar et al., 2003, Bottasso and Sembenelli, 2004). Empirical 
studies focusing upon the relationship between family ownership and firm performance have 
been examined in the finance literature, but very few studies linked family ownership with a 
firm’s technical efficiency. Lauterbach and Vaninsky (1999) used dummy variables for 
family and partnership ownership to examine the effect of family and partnership ownership 
on a firm’s technical efficiency, conducted using the two-stage DEA approach. Their results 
revealed a significantly negative association between family and partnership ownership and 
firm technical efficiency for 280 Israeli firms. In the case of Thailand, Wiwattanakantung 
(2001) and Yammeesri and Loadh (2003) investigated the effect of family ownership on a 
firm’s performance based on accounting or financial measures. Both studies, however, used a 
cut-off shareholding level of at least 25 percent for Thai listed enterprises, since shareholders 
must have at least 75 percent of their voting rights to obtain the absolute power over the 
public limited firm due to the Public Limited Companies Act B.E. 2535 of Thailand (Section 
31).  
A number of empirical studies have also investigated the effect of export participation 
on a firm’s technical efficiency (the learning-by-exporting hypothesis). Kim (2003) used the 
ratio of exports to total revenues as a proxy for export intensity, and found that exports 
positively affect technical efficiency for the food and paper industries, but such a finding is 
not found in the textile, chemical, and fabrication industries for Korean manufacturing 
industries. Dilling-Hansen et al. (2003) used a dummy variable for exports, but found no 
effect of exports on firm technical efficiency for 2,370 Danish firms. Granér and Isaksson 
(2007) used a dummy variable as a proxy for export participation, and found that exports 
significantly increased the technical efficiency of Kenyan manufacturing firms. Many 
empirical studies have also investigated the effect of firm size on a firm’s performance based 





countries and sectors. Empirical studies have also used different proxies for  firm size, which 
can be represented as either (i) total assets (see Kim (2003), Sheu and Yang (2005), Liao et al 
(2010)), (ii) the number of employees (see Bottasso and Sembenelli (2004)), and (iii) 
intermediate inputs (see Lundvall and Battese (2000), Hossain and Karunaratne (2004), 
Oczkowski and Sharma (2005)).  
III. Data Sources and Data Classification 
Data Sources 
The raw data used in this study was obtained from the Stock Exchange of Thailand. In 
this study, annually consolidated financial reports are used, since all business activities of 
listed firms including their subsidiary companies are recorded in annually consolidated 
financial reports. Form 56-1 is an annual company report required by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), where all Thai listed firms are obligated to disclose their 
annual business performance for shareholders and investors. Form 56-1 consists of three 
main parts: (i) executive summary, (ii) company issuing securities, and (iii) confirmation of 
accuracy. Part (ii) is used for this study. 
Data Classification 
This study classifies manufacturing listed firms from among listed firms into eight industrial 
sectors. The SET’s eight industrial sectors consist of (1) Agro and Food Industry, (2) 
Consumer Products, (3) Financials, (4) Industrials, (5) Property and Construction, (6) 
Resources (energy & utilities), (7) Services, and (8) Technology. With regard to International 
Standard Industrial Classification of all economic activities (ISIC), it is necessary to remove 
some listed firms that are not classified as manufacturing firms. In addition, this study also 
includes listed manufacturing firms that had been delisted from the SET during 2000 to 2008. 
As a result, 178 listed manufacturing firms over the period 2000 to 2008 will be used to 








IV. Empirical Models 
The Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and the two-stage Data Envelopment 
Analysis approaches are used to conduct the empirical analysis. The differences between the 
SFA and the DEA approaches are that the SFA requires functional forms on the production 
frontier, and assumes that firms may deviate from the production frontier not only due to 
technical inefficiency but also from measurement errors, statistical noise or other non-
systematic influences (Admassie and Matambalya, 2002). In addition, the SFA requires 
strong distribution assumptions of both statistical random errors (i.e., normal distribution) and 
non-negative technical inefficiency random variables (i.e., half-normal distribution for time-
invariant inefficiency model (see Pitt and Lee (1981)), and truncated normal distribution for 
both the time-invariant inefficiency model (see Battese and Coelli (1988)) and the time-
variant inefficiency model (see Battese and Coelli (1992),1995)). The DEA approach, 
however, does not impose functional forms, and uses linear programming to construct a 
frontier that envelops the observations of all firms. Hence, all firms are compared relative to 
the “best” performing firms. It also overcomes restrictions on the production and distribution 
of various residuals.   
The Stochastic Frontier Production Function Model 
This study follows the model of Battese and Coelli (1995) which allows technical 
efficiency levels to change over time. The model consists of two main components. The first 
component is to estimate the time-varying stochastic frontier production function which 
contains two random errors: (i) random errors ( ) and non-negative random variables 
( ). The first random errors, which are assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed normal random variables with zero means and variances,   ~  0, , 
can be observed, for example, when the problems of omitted variables and model 
misspecification arise. The second non-negative random variables which are assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed normal random variables as truncations at zero with 
Zit  means and variances   ~  0,  are known as the technical inefficiency 
effects. In addition, these two random variables are assumed to be independently distributed 





The second component links firm-specific variables (i.e., types of firm ownership, 
firm age, and firm size) with the inefficiency effects or non-negative random variables. In 
other words, this part aims to examine what firm-specific variables significantly affect the 
firm’s inefficiency. The stochastic frontier production function and the inefficiency effects 
will be simultaneously estimated by the method of maximum likelihood (ML) which has 
desirable large sample (or asymptotic) properties. More specifically, the ML estimator is 
consistent and asymptotically efficient (Coelli, 2005, p. 218). FRONTIER Version 4.1 is used 
to conduct a single - step process in which the stochastic frontier production and the model of 
technical inefficiency effects are estimated simultaneously by the method of maximum 
likelihood estimation (Quasi-Newton methods) (see Coelli (1996)). This software utilizes the 
parameterisation from Battese and Corra (1977) by replacing  and  with  
and / . The technical inefficiency for the  firm in the Battese and Coelli 
(1995) model is given by TE  = exp (- U ,) = exp (-Z δ - W ). Applying the model of 
Battese and Coelli (1995), the stochastic frontier production functions in the Cobb-Douglas 
and translog functional forms are tested for adequate functional form. The Cobb-Douglas 
 b i e : functional form can e wr tt n as
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 =   Sales revenue deflated by the manufacturing Producer Price Index (PPI) 
here: 
  
 =   Employee expenses deflated by the manufacturing Producer Price Index (PPI)                                     
        of firm i at time t 
   
 =   Net productive fixed assets deflated by the Producer Price Index (PPI) of                                       
        of firm i at time t 





 = Intermediate inputs deflated by the Producer Price Index (PPI) of                                       
   pu s of firm i
 =    Random error ( ~ 0, )) 
         intermediate in t  at time t 
 =    Non-negative random variable (or technical inefficiency) ( ~ Zit , )) 
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Whe
 = Leverage of firm i at time t, represented by the ratio of total debt to    
re: 
         
  = Liquidity of firm i at time t, represented by the ratio of current assets    
     total assets (the D/A  Ratio) 
         
 = Dummy for internal financing; 
     to current liabilities (the Current  Ratio) 
               = 1 if firm i at time t borrows from related parties.  
          
 = External financing, represented by total interest expenses deflated by  
               = 0, otherwise          
          
 = Executive Remuneration of firm i at time t, represented by the ratio    
    the general Producer Price Index (PPI) 
             
5  = Controlling ownership of firm i at time t, represented by the  
 of top executive and board member remunerations to total employee expenses  
           
   = Managerial ownership of firm i at time t, represented by                                                      
    percentage of equity owned by the five largest shareholders 
          
    =  Exports of firm i at time t, represented by the ratio of export revenue   
        top executives and board members     
           
&    =  Dummy for Research and Development: 
       to total sales revenue  
                 &  = 1 if firm i at time t has R&D.  
             
   =   for a family-owned firm: 
                = 0, otherwise          
Dummy
                    = 1 if firm i at time t is a family-owned firm. 
            
  =  D y for a foreign-owned firm: 
                  = 0, otherwise          
umm
                    = 1 if firm i at time t is a foreign-owned firm. 





 =  D estic-owned firm: ummy for a dom
                  = 1 if firm i at time t is a domestically-owned firm. 
          
  =  D y for a hybrid-owned firm 
                    = 0, otherwise          
umm
             = 1 if firm i at time t is a hybrid-owned firm.           
           
  =  Size of firm i at time t, represented by the logarithm form of total assets 
                   = 0, otherwise          
 = Age of firm i at time t, represented by the number of operating years   
 = D  for Government support  ummy
             = 1 if firm i at time t receives Board of Investment (BOI) support.          
          
   = D  for foreign cooperation  
                     = 0, otherwise          
ummy
               = 1 if firm i at time t engages in foreign cooperation          
                               = 0, otherwise          
       = Random error (( ~ 0, )) 
 
Basic descriptive statistics for all the variables mentioned above are provided in Appendix 1. 
Two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
 The non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) can also be used to predict 
technical efficiency, which involves the use of a linear programming method to construct a 
non-parametric piece-wise surface (or frontier) over the data (Coelli et al., 2005, p.162). This 
study applies the variable returns to scale (VRS) linear programming problem to predict the 
technical efficiency for the first-stage of the two-stage DEA approach (see F re, Grosskopf, 
Logan (1983) and Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984)). The VRS assumes that firms are not 
operating at an optimal scale due to imperfect competition, government intervention, and 
financial constraints (Coelli et al., 2005). In addition, the output orientated model is used, 
assuming fixed input amounts and maximized output production. The VRS linear 
programming program under the output orientated model can be written as follows: 
                                                            ,       , 
          st           i=1,2,….,n,    0, 




                                                                          0,                                               (1.4) 
 
 
Where:   is a scalar. 1   0,  and  is the proportional increase in outputs ( ) 
which can be obtained for the  firm, while holding input amounts ( ) constant. 
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  is the 
efficiency score for the  firm.   is an output vector for the  firm.    is an input vector 
for the  firm.  is a vector of constants.  defines non-increasing returns to scale 
(NIRS).  
The DEA model in linear programming (1.4) also replaces the convexity constraint 
which is imposed for the VRS: I1 1F2F  for  I1 1. The modified  I1 1 indicates 
that the VRS can only be non-increasing. In other words, the constraint:  I1 1 is set to 
ensure that the  firm is compared with firms that are smaller than it (see Coelli et al. (2005), 
p.174)). The second stage of the two-stage DEA model is conducted by regressing 
environmental variables on the firm’s VRS technical inefficiency scores which are predicted 
from the first step of the two-stage DEA model. The firm’s technical inefficiency scores are 
used as the dependent variable, which is obtained by subtracting the efficiency scores 
estimated from the DEA model from “one”.  The set of environmental variables are used as 
independent variables for the two-stage DEA model. The estimated inefficiency scores are 
normally bounded between zero and one. Applying the method of Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) with such a dependent variable that its values are bounded between zero and one will 
lead to biased and inconsistent estimators, since the OLS method is likely to predict 
inefficiency scores which are greater than one (Coelli et al., 2005). Therefore, the Maximum 
Likelihood estimation for a Tobi m  adopted, which is given as follows:  t odel is
                                        (1-   ∑ +                                   (1.5)   
Where: 
1-
      = Unknown param ter to be estimated for each environmental variable j and time t 
  = Inefficiency scores of firm i and time t. 
e




2 This convexity constraint is set to ensure that an inefficient firm is only “benchmarked” against other firms 




V.  Hypothesis Tests  
There are a number of null hypotheses for the SFA approach that will be tested (see 
Table 2). A likelihood-ratio test (LR test) is used to test these hypotheses, which can be 
conducted as follows:  
                  2 log
Where, log  and log  are obtained from the maximized values of the log-
likelihood function under the null hypothesis ( ) and the alternative hypothesis ( ), 
respectively. From Table 2 the null hypothesis (i) is to test whether the Cobb-Douglas 
production function is adequate for the SET’s manufacturing sector including all sub-
manufacturing sectors. Following equations (1.1) and (1.2) the null hypothesis   
          0   is strongly rejected at 
the 5 percent level of significance. Therefore, the Cobb-Douglas production function is not an 
adequate specification for the case of overall Thai listed manufacturing sector including all 
SET’s sub-manufacturing sectors, compared with the specification of the Translog production 
function model. This also indicates that input and substitution elasticities are not constant 
among firms (see Lundvall and Battese, 2000). The null hypothesis (ii) that there is no 
technical progress       0   is rejected at the 5 percent 
level of significance for the SET’s manufacturing sector including most sub-manufacturing 
sectors, except Agro & Food Industry in which technical progress is not found in this sub-
manufacturing sector. Under the translog specification technology for (1.2), the percentage 
change in output in each period due to technological change (t) is given by 
  log                              (1.6) 
 =  + 2  t 
(see Coelli et al., 2005).  
From Table 3 technological change affects the percentage change to output by 
0.091+2* (-0.05)* t for overall Thai listed manufacturing enterprises.  The slope of  F3F in 
the translog production function (1.2) is negative, which is given by -0.05, also indicating that 
technological progress tends to decrease over time for overall Thai listed manufacturing 
enterprises. Similarly, technical progress is likely to decrease for Consumer Products and 
Other Sectors, except Industrials. The null hypothesis (iii) that technical progress is neutral  
                                                            
 





  0        0  is also rejected at the 5 percent level of significance for the SET’s 
manufacturing sector including other sub manufacturing sectors such as Consumer Products, 
Industry, and Other Sectors. This indicates that technical change not only merely affects 
average output, but also changes marginal rates of technical substitution4. The null 
hypothesis (iv) which specifies that the inefficiency effects are absent from the model  
  …   0   is strongly rejected at the 5 percent level of significance, which 
implies that the model of inefficiency effects exists for the case of the SET’s manufacturing 
sector including all sub-manufacturing sectors. The null hypothesis (v) that the inefficiency 
effects are not “stochastic” ( 0  is strongly rejected, implying that the model of inefficiency 
effects is not reduced to a traditional mean response function5. In addition, if the estimate of 
the variance parameter ( ) is close to one, it indicates that overall residual variation 
(  and ) highly results from inefficiency components ( .  
From Table 3 the estimated  (0.872) is high for the SET’s manufacturing sector6, 
indicating that much of the variation in the composite error term is due to inefficiency effects 
( . The last null hypothesis specifies that inefficiency effects are not a linear function of 
all explanatory variables   0 . All LR test statistics are 
greater than the critical value of an approximately chi-square distribution (see Table 2) at the 
5 percent level of significance, implying that the null hypothesis that all coefficients of the 
explanatory variables are equal to zero is strongly rejected at the 5 percent level of 
significance for the SET’s manufacturing sector including all sub-manufacturing sectors. 
According to the rejection of the last null hypothesis test, the model of inefficiency effects of 
the SET’s manufacturing sector as well as sub-manufacturing sectors can be assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed as truncations at zero of the normal distribution with 
mean,   and variance,  (see Battese and Coelli (1995)). For the two-stage DEA model 
the null hypothesis that all parameters of the explanatory variables are equal to zero is also 
rejected at the 5 level of significance (see Table 4). In addition, the majority of the estimates 
 
4 The marginal rate of substitution is not dependent on time, indicating that Hicks neutral technology does not 
exist for the SET’s manufacturing sector including Consumer Products, Industry, and Other Sectors. 
5All the explanatory variables in the inefficiency effects model are not included in the production function, 
implying that the inefficiency effects model exists and therefore the estimated parameters can be identified in 
the model of inefficiency ef cts. 
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6 Similarly, the estimated s are also high, which are given by 0.690, 0.995, and 0.697 for Agro & Food 





of the Translog production frontier parameters are statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level of significance for the SET’s manufacturing sector including sub-manufacturing sectors 
(see Table 3). It is also common to observe that some of the individual coefficients of the 
Translog stochastic frontier are not statistically insignificant due to high multicollinearity 
among the inputs (see Lundvall and Battese (2000), Oczkowski and Sharma (2005)). 
VI. Consistency of the Results from Data Envelopment Analysis and Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis  
 
 The empirical results between the two-stage DEA and the SFA are quite consistent 
(see Table 6). The average technical efficiency scores for Thai listed manufacturing 
enterprises predicted by the SFA and the DEA are 0.812 and 0.887, respectively (see 
Appendix 2)7. The technical efficiency scores obtained from the SFA should be normally 
lower than those scores obtained from the DEA, since the technical efficiency scores 
predicted by the DEA does not separate the non-negative technical inefficiency components 
( ) from the systematic errors (  ).  However, if the estimated  is close to 1 this implies 
that the error variation is mainly due to inefficiency effects. The technical efficiency scores 
are undoubtedly smaller for SFA than those scores obtained from DEA (see Sirasoontorn, 
2004). The empirical results from both estimation approaches also reveal that Thai listed 
manufacturing enterprises operated under decreasing returns to scale over the period 2000 to 
2008. The DEA approach indicates that approximately 86% of Thai listed manufacturing 
firms, on average, had operated under decreasing returns to scale (DRS) during the period 
2000 to 2008, given the specification of the output-orientated model (see Appendix 3). 
Similarly, the input elasticities given by 0.545 ( + )8 indicates the existence of 
moderate decreasing returns to scale for Thai listed manufacturing enterprises (see Table 3). 
The empirical results of both the SFA and the two-stage DEA approaches are found to 
produce quite consistent results as summarized in Table 6. Both approaches confirm that 
leverage (financial constraints) has a significantly positive effect on the firm’s technical 
efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector including Consumer Products, but such a 
significantly negative result is found for the Agro & Food Industry and Other Sectors.  
 
7 In addition, the technical efficiency scores predicted by the SFA and the DEA for Agro & Food Industry, 
Consumer Produc , Indu rials, and Other Sectors are given by 0.843 and 0.889, 0.767 and 0.854, 0 0 and 
0.911, and 0.791 a 0.88 respectively (see Appendix 2). 
ts st .83
nd 3, 
8 The coefficients  and  are statistically significant at the 5 percent level of significance, but   is not 





Significant and positive results imply that financially constrained firms tend to utilize 
their financial resources and control input costs effectively, leading to an enhancement in 
their technical efficiency. To confirm this conclusion, both estimation approaches reveal that 
a firm’s leverage is found to be significantly negatively related with the technical efficiency 
for the SET’s manufacturing sector including Consumer Products and Industrials. The 
empirical evidence from both approaches also confirms that external financing has a 
significantly negative relationship with a firm’s technical efficiency for the SET’s 
manufacturing sector including Industrials. Positive evidence is also found in Consumer 
Products and Other Sectors, except for a difference in the significance of the results from 
both approaches. A positive result is also found in the Agro & Food Industry, but empirical 
results from both approaches are found to be statistically insignificant at the 5 percent level of 
significance. However, the relationship is weak due to the small size of the external financing 
coefficients (close to zero) for overall SET’s manufacturing sector, including all sub-
manufacturing sectors. In addition, “internal financing” is also found to have a negative effect 
on a firm’s technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector including Agro & Food 
Industry and Consumer Products, except for a difference in the significance of the results for 
both approaches. A negative result implies that an agency problem exists from the use of 
internal funds, since managers do not appear to maximize shareholders’ interests or have 
strong incentives to abuse internal funds. This is especially the case in underdeveloped 
countries where firms’ managerial rights are not fully developed and their information is not 
fully disclosed, and therefore managers attempt to maximize their benefits rather than the 
firm’s value (Kim, 2003, p.134).  
The coefficient for “executive remuneration” from both approaches is found to be 
significantly positive in the SET’s manufacturing sector including Consumer Products. A 
positive effect is also found in the Agro & Food Industry, except the significance results from 
both approaches are statistically different. A positive result implies that listed manufacturing 
firms with higher levels of executive remuneration tend to have more technical efficiency. 
According to the finance literature regarding ownership structure, the empirical results from 
both approaches confirm that managerial ownership has a significantly positive relationship 
with the firm’s technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector and Industrials. A 
positive result is also found in the Agro & Food Industry but the significance of the results 





problem is reduced, since managerial ownership can help align the conflict of interests 
between shareholders and managers.  
Controlling ownership is also found to have a positive association with firm technical 
efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector including Consumer Products, Industrials, and 
Other Sectors, but the significance of the results from both approaches are statistically 
different. A positive result supports agency theory that controlling shareholders are likely to 
perform better than dispersed shareholders, since a high level of ownership concentration can 
reduce agency costs. Exporting is also found to be significantly positively related with firm 
technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector. Such a positive relationship is also 
found in the Agro & Food Industry, Industrials and Other Sector, but the significance of these 
results from both approaches are statistically different. A positive result implies that export 
market experience (i.e., new product designs and production methods), which is gained from 
communication between foreign partners and exporting firms, tends to improve the technical 
efficiency of exporting firms. Results from both estimation approaches reveal that research & 
development (R&D) has a significant and negative impact on firm technical efficiency for the 
SET’s manufacturing sector including Consumer Products. Such a negative finding also 
implies that most listed manufacturing firms doubtfully reported their R&D activities in their 
annual report, and in fact did not intend to implement them seriously.  
Focusing on the classification of different ownership types among listed 
manufacturing firms the results from both approaches indicate that family-owned firms have 
a significantly positive impact on firm technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing 
sector including Consumer Products, but a significantly positive relationship is found in the 
industrials sector. A positive result is also found in Other Sectors, but the significance of 
these results for both approaches are statistically different. The empirical evidence from both 
approaches reveals that foreign-owned firms have a significant and positive effect on  firm 
technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector including Consumer Products. A 
positive result is also found for the Agro & Food Industry sector, but the significance of these 
results for both approaches are statistically different. Domestically-owned firms are found to 
have a positive impact on firm technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sectors, but 
the significance of these results for both approaches are statistically different. Domestic-
owned firms, however, have a significant and negative relationship with firm technical 





significant and positive relationship with firm technical efficiency for the SET’s 
manufacturing sector. The positive relationship is also found in Agro & Food Industry and 
Consumer Products, but significance results from both approaches are statistically different. 
Joint-owned firms as indicated by the constant coefficient are found to have a significantly 
negative relationship with firm technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector 
including almost all sub-manufacturing sectors, except for Other Sector where both 
approaches report a positive coefficient but there is a difference in the significance results. 
For all Thai listed manufacturing enterprises foreign-owned firms perform the best among 
other types of owned firms, followed by family-owned firms, hybrid-owned firms, and 
domestic-owned firms, given joint-owned firms as the base firm. Moreover, there is strong 
evidence from both estimation approaches that a firm’s size tends to have a statistically 
positively effect on its technical efficiency for the SET’s manufacturing sector, including 
almost all sub-manufacturing sectors.  
VII. Conclusions and Implications 
This study has applied the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and two-stage Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approaches. Dealing with unbalanced panel data Frontier 
Version 4.1 can be used to analyse the time-variant efficiency model of Battese and Coelli 
(1995). The advantage of the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) approach under the 
specification of Battese and Coelli (1995) is that it allows investigation of technical progress 
through an estimated production function. For the DEA approach the investigation for 
technological progress can be referred, for example, to the use of a Malmquist TFP index 
which can be decomposed into “technical efficiency change” and “technological change”. A 
Malmquist TFP index analysed by DEA, however, can only be applied for the case of 
balanced panel data. The SFA approach can investigate types of returns to scale for the 
industry-level context through an aggregate of estimated input elasticities (See Coelli et al., 
2005, p. 304), but the DEA approach can examine types of returns to scale for the firm-level 
context. The significance coefficients of time interacted with capital (  and labour ) 
for all manufacturing enterprises are negative and positive, respectively, indicating that 
technical change has been labour-using but capital-saving (see Table 3). This result implies 
that technological progress for Thai listed manufacturing firms still relies on basic production 
resources, such as labour input. In addition, the negative coefficient of time squared (  also 






over the period 2000 to 2008 (see Table 3). The empirical results from both estimation 
approaches are found to produce consistent results. For sub-listed manufacturing sectors both 
approaches empirically find quite consistent results in coefficient signs, but significance 
results from both estimation approaches may be different (see Table 6). 
According to the empirical evidence from these two approaches, industry-specific 
policy guidelines are also recommended to promote technical efficiency for Thai listed 
manufacturing enterprises. First, policy guidelines can be implemented as follows: (i) 
promote more firm ownership participation for a group of people (i.e., workers, 
administrative staff, managers, and owners who control or participate in listed manufacturing 
firms, and encourage listed manufacturing firms to set up attractive rewards for top 
management and board of directors when firms achieve a certain level of profits as planned; 
(ii) encourage more foreign participation in listed manufacturing firms; (iii) encourage listed 
manufacturing firms to engage in more export participation; (iv) promote an increase in firm 
size; (v) encourage listed manufacturing firms to fully disclose the use of financial resources; 
(v) encourage listed manufacturing firms to enhance labour skills or focus on more 
sophisticated technology.  
Table 1: Classification of Listed Manufacturing Firms in the SET during 2000 to 2008 
No of  ctorsse        Manufacturing Sectors   No o msf fir   No of firms   
1 Agro & Food Industry   
1.1  Agribusiness 20   
1.2 Food & Beverage 20   
Total      40 
2 Consumer Products   
2.1 Fashion 1  8   
2.2 Home & Office Products 1  1   
2.3 Personal Products & Pharmaceuticals 4   
Total      33 
3 Industrials   
3.1 Automotive 12   
3.2 Industrial Materials & Machinery 1  9   
3.3 Packaging 13   
3.4 Paper & Printing Materials 2   
3.5 Petrochemicals & Chemicals 13   
Total      59 
4 Publishing 7 
5 Construction Materials 27 
6 Technology (Computer components) 12 






   Table 2: Statistics for Hypotheses Tests of the Stochastic Frontier and Inefficiency Models for the SET’s Manufacturing Sectors 
     Source: Author’s estimates  
 Note: All critical values of the test statistics are subject to the 5% level of significance; * indicates a mixture of  distribution (see Kodde and Palrm, 1986);** includes Publishing,   
Construction Materials, and Technology (Computer components) (see Table 1) 
   All manufacturing Agro & Food Industry Consumer Products Industrials Other Sectors** 
Null Hypothesis LR  Critical  Decision  LR  Critical  Decision  LR  Critical  Decision  LR  Critical  Decision  LR  Critical  Decision 
   Statistics  Value  Statistic Value  Statistics  Value  Statistics  Value  Statistics Value 
Cobb‐ uglasDo        
:  
     
     0  
211.94  18.31 Reject 82.26 18.31  Reject 104.31  18.31  Reject 98.07  18.31  Reject 128.33 18.31  Reject  
No technical progres    s
:   
 0        
25.93  11.07 Reject 5.00  11.07  Do not 
reject 
54.88  11.07  Reject 77.46  11.07  Reject 22.69  11.07  Reject  
Neutral technical change                
     0 33.92  7.81  Reject ‐  ‐  - 33.56  7.81  Reject 53.91  7.81  Reject  12.67  7.81  Reject  
No ineffi y ts  cienc  effec
:   … 0     628.05  29.55* Reject 217.89 29.55*  Reject 533.99  29.55*  Reject 378.83  29.55*  Reject 75.47  29.55*  Reject  
Non stochastic inefficiency                
 ( : 0   1207.1  2.71* Reject 207.23 2.71*  Reject 637.85  2.71*  Reject 206.83  2.71*  Reject 308.68 2.71*  Reject  
No inefficiency 




Table 3: Maximum-Likelihood Estimates for Parameters of the Stochastic Frontier 
Variable  All  Agro & Food   Consumer   Industrials    Other  
Stochastic frontiers  Manufacturing  Industry  Products  Sectors***
Constant  3.871*  1.071*  ‐1.454*  22.498*  1.060* 
(0.512)  (0.314)  (0.551)  (2.033)  (0.479) 
log(L)****  1.002*  0.612*  0.288  ‐0.343  0.536* 
(0.132)  (0.094)  (0.186)  (0.390)  (0.122) 
log(K)****  ‐0.700*  0.128  0.563*  0.684  0.079 
(0.109)  (0.087)  (0.144)  (0.533)  (0.091) 
log(M)****  0.243  0.282*  0.689*  ‐3.144*  0.381* 
(0.152)  (0.076)  (0.228)  (0.753)  (0.105) 
t  0.091*  ‐  0.029  ‐0.227*  0.046 
(0.043)  ‐  (0.034)  (0.119)  (0.033) 
½ (log(L)2)  0.079*  0.088*  ‐0.097**  0.237*  0.096* 
  (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.052)  (0.049)  (0.038) 
½ (log(K)2)  ‐0.101*  0.022  ‐0.046**  ‐0.191  ‐0.054* 
  (0.026)   (0.021)  (0.028)  (0.132)  (0.020) 
½ (log(M)2)  0.129*  0.165*  0.144*  0.620*  0.179* 
  (0.028)  (0.013)  (0.051)  (0.228)  (0.022) 
½ (t2)  ‐0.005  ‐  ‐0.003  0.00007  ‐0.010** 
  (0.005)  ‐  (0.002)  (0.010)  (0.004) 
log(L)*log(K)  0.088*  0.000  0.126*  0.169**  0.056* 
  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.033)  (0.088)  (0.021) 
log(L)*log(M)  ‐0.211*  ‐0.115*  ‐0.047*  ‐0.261*  ‐0.175* 
  (0.026)  (0.014)  (0.030)  (0.100)  (0.021) 
log(L)* t  ‐0.020*  ‐  0.008**  ‐0.026  0.011** 
  (0.008)  ‐  (0.005)  (0.019)  (0.006) 
log(K)*log(M)  0.089*  ‐0.027**  ‐0.110*  ‐0.060  0.006 
  (0.019)  (0.015)  (0.027)  (0.161)  (0.017) 
log(K)*t  0.016*  ‐  ‐0.015*  0.008  ‐0.003 
  (0.006)  ‐  (0.004)  (0.024)  (0.004) 
log(M)*t  ‐0.004  ‐  0.005  0.040  ‐0.005 
   (0.007)  ‐  (0.005)  (0.031)  (0.005) 
Source: Authors’ estimates  
Note:  Standard Errors (S.E.) are in parentheses; * indicates that the coefficients are statistically significant at 
the 5% level;**indicates that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 10% level; *** includes 
Publishing, Construction Materials, and Technology (Computer components) (see Table 1); **** L is the labour 








Table 4: Maximum-Likelihood Estimates for Parameters of the Inefficiency Models 
from the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) approach 
 
Inefficiency  All  Agro & Food  Consumer   Industrials      Other 
Variables  Manufacturing Industry Products Sectors***
Constant  13.257* 1.656* 10.538* 14.159*  1.975*
(1.850) (0.599) (1.682) (1.097)  (0.567)
Leverage  ‐0.038* 0.167* ‐1.247* 0.017  0.292*
(0.019) (0.030) (0.293) (0.014)  (0.076)
Liquidity  0.219* ‐0.047* 0.120* 0.124*  0.009
(0.016) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014)  (0.008)
Internal financing  0.635* 0.103* 0.892* 0.100  0.124*
(0.139) (0.034) (0.128) (0.085)  (0.060)
External financing  0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000*  0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.0008) (0.000)  (0.000)
Executive remuneration ‐0.433* ‐0.242 ‐5.168* 0.014  ‐0.109
(0.212) (0.172) (0.846) (0.115)  (0.413)
Controlling ownership  ‐0.035* ‐0.001 ‐0.011** ‐0.015*  ‐0.004*
(0.003) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003)  (0.002)
Managerial ownership  ‐0.023* ‐0.001 ‐0.008* ‐0.004*  0.009
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002)  (0.003)
Exports  ‐0.012* 0.001* 0.008* ‐0.005*  ‐0.001*
(0.002) (0.0005) (0.004) (0.002)  (0.001)
R&D  0.746* ‐0.051 0.878* 0.101  ‐0.202*
(0.150) (0.062) (0.164) (0.087)  (0.067)
Family ownership  ‐3.681* 0.133 ‐3.319* 0.044  ‐0.182**
(0.281) (0.390) (0.211) (0.207)  (0.101)
Foreign ownership  ‐3.910* ‐0.012 ‐3.268* 0.237  0.631*
(0.504) (0.395) (0.266) (0.180)  (0.231)
Domestic ownership  ‐1.420* 0.361 ‐0.066 0.469*  0.221*
(0.206) (0.394) (0.507) (0.198)  (0.114)
Hybrid ownership  ‐2.726* ‐0.019 ‐3.652* ‐0.070  0.137
(0.192) (0.412) (0.247) (0.216)  (0.107)
Firm size  ‐0.777* ‐0.132* ‐0.813* ‐0.868*  ‐0.138*
(0.125) (0.028) (0.116) (0.068)  (0.038)
Firm age  ‐0.040* 0.002 0.028* 0.008*  0.002
(0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004)  (0.002)
Government assistance ‐0.716* 0.031 ‐0.494* 0.080  ‐0.184*
(0.171) (0.047) (0.156) (0.079)  (0.066)
Foreign cooperation  0.191* 0.194* 0.898* ‐0.290*  ‐0.234*
(0.097) (0.053) (0.165) (0.114)  (0.116)
Variance parameters 
sigma‐square  1.080* 0.009* 0.425* 0.181*  0.055*
(0.067) ‐0.001 ‐0.032 ‐0.017  ‐0.01
gamma  0.872* 0.690* 0.995* 0.271*  0.697*
(0.012) ‐0.065 ‐0.002 ‐0.055  ‐0.09
Log‐likelihood function                  ‐745.05 428.12 189.1 ‐207.01  130.55
Source: Authors’ estimates 
 Note:  Standard Errors (S.E.) are in parentheses; * indicates that the coefficients are statistically significant at 
the 5% level;**indicates that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 10% level; *** includes 





Table 5: Maximum-Likelihood Tobit Estimates for Parameters of the Two-Stage DEA 
approach 
Firm Specific Variables All Agro & Food Consumer  Industrials    Other
     Manufacturing Industry Products  Sectors***
Left censoring (value) at zero  93  13  1  52  27 
Uncensored observations  1214 309 250  345  310
     Total observations  1307 322 251  397  337
Dependent variable: Technical inefficiency (VRS)
Constant  0.5838* 0.6564* 0.7542*  0.3257* 0.4880
(0.0294) (0.0509) (0.0923)  (0.0602) (0.0541)
Leverage  ‐0.0048* 0.0129* ‐0.0386*  ‐0.0035* 0.0277*
(0.0012) (0.0058) (0.0141)  (0.0016) (0.0090)
Liquidity  0.0023* 0.0012 0.0024*  0.0073* ‐0.0014
(0.0006) (0.0015) (0.0009)  (0.0016) (0.0010)
Internal financing  0.0052 0.0028 0.0126  ‐0.0050 ‐0.0109**
(0.0037) (0.0047) (0.0064)  (0.0085) (0.0064)
External financing  0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000* 0.0000*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000)
Executive remuneration ‐0.1018* ‐0.0950* ‐0.1990*  ‐0.0933* 0.0334
(0.0186) (0.0289) (0.0564)  (0.0296) (0.0415)
Controlling ownership  ‐0.0002 0.0003* ‐0.0001  ‐0.0001 ‐0.0005*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003)  (0.0002) (0.0002)
Managerial ownership  ‐0.0004* ‐0.0002** 0.0004  ‐0.0007* ‐0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003)  (0.0002) (0.0002)
Exports  ‐0.0001** ‐0.0002* 0.0001  ‐0.0001 ‐0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0002) (0.0001)
R&D  0.0145* 0.0236* 0.0307*  ‐0.0081 0.0271*
(0.0044) (0.0073) (0.0120)  (0.0097) (0.0079)
Family ownership  ‐0.0272* ‐0.0723* ‐0.0327*  0.0408** ‐0.0093
(0.0067) (0.0234) (0.0086)  (0.0229) (0.0102)
Foreign ownership  ‐0.0428* ‐0.0769* ‐0.0314*  ‐0.0039 ‐0.0227*
(0.0076) (0.0236) (0.0119)  (0.0226) (0.0116)
Domestic ownership  ‐0.0067 ‐0.0463** 0.0157  0.0385** 0.0273*
(0.0083) (0.0264) (0.0216)  (0.0234) (0.0122)
Hybrid ownership  ‐0.0224* ‐0.0641* ‐0.0187  0.0117  0.0305*
(0.0084) (0.0243) (0.0145)  (0.0252) (0.0130)
Firm size  ‐0.0295* ‐0.0369* ‐0.0439*  ‐0.0184* ‐0.0240*
(0.0017) (0.0026) (0.0059)  (0.0038) (0.0032)
Firm age  0.0000 0.0013* 0.0010*  0.0005  ‐0.0005
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004)  (0.0003) (0.0003)
Government assistance 0.0076** 0.0168* 0.0117  0.0235* 0.0083
(0.0040) (0.0062) (0.0071)  (0.0087) (0.0075)
Foreign cooperation  0.0030 ‐0.0003 0.0070  0.0148** 0.0016
(0.0033) (0.0069) (0.0087)  (0.0089) (0.0042)
      Error Distribution  0.059* 0.035* 0.044* 0.065* 0.050*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
      Log likelihood (unrestricted)             1594    588   423    401    464
      Log likelihood (restricted)***            1405    445   357   331    362
       LR test             377*   286*  132*   141*   204*









Table 6: Comparison of the Results of Maximum-Likelihood Estimates for Parameters 
between the SFA and the Two-Stage DEA approaches 
Dependent variable:   All    Agro & Food  Consumer   Industrials       Other 
Technical inefficiency   Manufacturing   Industry  Products     Sectors *** 
 (Pure or VRS)  SFA  DEA  SFA  DEA  SFA  DEA SFA  DEA  SFA  DEA
Independent variables :                               
Constant  +*  +*  +*  +*  +*  +*  +*  +*  +*  + 
Leverage  ‐*  ‐*  +*  +*  ‐*  ‐*  +  ‐*  +*  +* 
Liquidity  +*  +*  ‐*  +  +*  +*  +*  +*  +  ‐* 
Internal financing  +*  +  +*  +  +*  +  +  ‐  +*  ‐** 
External financing  +*  +*  +  +  +  +*  +*  +*  +  +* 
Executive remuneration  ‐*  ‐*  ‐  ‐*  ‐*  ‐*  +  ‐*  ‐  + 
Controlling ownership  ‐*  ‐  ‐  +*  ‐**  ‐  ‐*  ‐  ‐*  ‐ 
Managerial ownership  ‐*  ‐*  ‐  ‐**  ‐*  +  ‐*  ‐*  +  ‐ 
Exports  ‐*  ‐**  +*  ‐*  +*  +  ‐*  ‐  ‐*  ‐ 
R&D  +*  +*  ‐  +*  +*  +*  +  ‐  ‐*  +* 
Family owned firm  ‐*  ‐*  +  ‐*  ‐*  ‐*  +*  +**  ‐**  ‐ 
Foreign owned firm  ‐*  ‐*  ‐  ‐*  ‐*  ‐*  +  ‐  +*  ‐* 
Domestic owned firm  ‐*  ‐  +  ‐**  ‐  +  +*  +**  +*  +* 
Hybrid owned firm  ‐*  ‐*  ‐  ‐*  ‐*  ‐  ‐  +  +  +* 
Firm size  ‐*  ‐*  ‐*  ‐*  ‐*  ‐*  ‐*  ‐*  ‐*  ‐* 
Firm age  ‐*  +  +  +*  +*  +*  +*  ‐  +  ‐ 
Government assistance  ‐*  +**  +  +*  ‐*  +  +  +*  ‐*  + 
Foreign cooperation  +*  +  +*  ‐  +*  +  ‐*  +**  ‐*  + 
                                
Source: Authors’ estimates 
Note:  * indicates that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level;**indicates that the 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 10% level; *** includes Publishing, Construction Materials, and 
Technology (Computer components) (see Table 1). 
 














Appendix 1: Data Summary 
Variables  Unit of Variables Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Observations
Output                      
      Ln (Sales revenue)  Natural Logarithm  9.95 9.88 14.56 5.49  1.36  1309
Inputs:             
      Ln (Labour expenses)  Natural Logarithm  7.64 7.66 11.84 3.71  1.15  1309
      Ln (Fixed productive)  Natural Logarithm  8.84 8.68 13.61 3.57  1.56  1309
      Ln (Intermediate inputs) Natural Logarithm  9.51 9.40 14.26 5.28  1.45  1309
Time trend  No. of years  5 5 9 1  3  1309
Finance:             
      Leverage  Ratio  0.57 0.43 29.13 0.01  1.5  1309
      Liquidity  Ratio  2.4 1.57 46.2 0  2.81  1309
     Internal financing  Dummy (ratio)  0.35 0 1 0  0.48  1309
     External financing  000 Baht  1747 203 140304 0  7721  1309
R&D  Dummy (ratio)  0.8 1 1 0  0.4  1309
Ownership structure:             
    Controlling ownership  Ratio  58.81 58.82 99.69 5.44  16.51  1309
    Managerial ownership  Ratio  20.55 12.70 96.53 0  21.69  1309
Types of owned firms:             
    Family‐owned firm  Dummy (ratio)  0.53 1 1 0  0.5  1309
    Foreign‐owned firm  Dummy (ratio)  0.19 0 1 0  0.39  1309
    Domestic owned firm  Dummy (ratio)  0.12 0 1 0  0.32  1309
    Joint owned firm  Dummy (ratio)  0.07 0 1 0  0.26  1309
    Hybrid owned firm  Dummy (ratio)  0.09 0 1 0  0.29  1309
Executive remuneration  Ratio  0.14 0.09 7 0.0032  0.32  1309
Exports  %  32.68 19.32 100 0  33.53  1309
Other factors:             
    Ln (total assets)   Natural Logarithm  14.76 14.54 19.47 11.73  1.27  1309
    Firm age  No. of years  26 24 95 0  12  1309
    Government assistance  Dummy (ratio)  0.62 1 1 0  0.49  1309
    Foreign cooperation  Dummy (ratio)  0.31 0 1 0  0.54  1309






                 Appendix 2: Average Technical Efficiency Scores Classified by Estimating Approaches and the SET’s Manufacturing Sectors 
   All Manufacturing   Agro & Food Industry Consumer Products  Industrials Other Sectors
   CRSTE  VRSTE  SCALE CRSTE VRSTE SCALE CRSTE VRSTE  SCALE CRSTE VRSTE SCALE CRSTE VRSTE SCALE 
2000         
SFA     ‐ 0.807  ‐  ‐ ‐ ‐0.846 0.783 ‐ 0.799 ‐ ‐     0.796  ‐ 
DEA 0.814  0.871  0.936 0.825 0.885 0.935 0.799 0.851 0.940 0.830 0.885 0.940 0.795 0.858 0.930 
2001      
SFA ‐ 0.803  ‐  ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.845 0.770 0.798 0.793 ‐ 
DEA 0.838  0.895  0.938 0.838 0.900 0.933 0.827 0.881 0.940 0.860 0.908 0.947 0.825 0.888 0.932 
2002      
SFA ‐ 0.803  ‐  ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.843 0.767 0.806 0.789 ‐ 
DEA 0.832  0.896  0.93 0.828 0.898 0.923 0.816 0.875 0.933 0.855 0.908 0.942 0.823 0.895 0.922 
2003      
SFA ‐ 0.807  ‐  ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.841 0.767 0.809 0.799 ‐ 
DEA 0.89 0.927  0.96 0.891 0.927 0.962 0.851 0.899 0.947 0.915 0.944 0.970 0.888 0.928 0.957 
2004      
SFA ‐ 0.821  ‐  ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.838      0.774   ‐ ‐ 0.851 0.801 ‐ 
DEA 0.826  0.901  0.917 0.817 0.898 0.912 0.804 0.876 0.919 0.855 0.923 0.927 0.813 0.896 0.910 
2005      
SFA ‐ 0.817  ‐  ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.843 0.776 0.844 0.790 ‐ 
DEA 0.779  0.878  0.889 0.757 0.868 0.875 0.740 0.839 0.883 0.828 0.911 0.910 0.765 0.873 0.880 
2006      
SFA ‐ 0.820  ‐  ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.846 0.769 0.855 0.791 ‐ 
DEA 0.789  0.878  0.9 0.778 0.875 0.890 0.743 0.833 0.894 0.836 0.910 0.920 0.773 0.874 0.887 
2007      
SFA ‐ 0.816  ‐  ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.845 0.757 0.853 0.788 ‐ 
DEA 0.784  0.876  0.897 0.769 0.877 0.880 0.736 0.821 0.898 0.832 0.909 0.917 0.772 0.874 0.887 
2008      
SFA ‐ 0.812  ‐  ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.844 0.743 0.857 0.776 ‐ 
DEA 0.787  0.870  0.906 0.774 0.873 0.889 0.738 0.815 0.906 0.835 0.904 0.925 0.772 0.874 0.887 
2000 ‐ 2008      
SFA ‐ 0.812  ‐  ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.843 0.767 ‐ 0.830 0.791 ‐ 
DEA 0.814  0.887  0.918 0.809 0.889 0.911 0.784 0.854 0.918 0.848 0.911 0.931 0.801 0.883 0.909 
                 Source: Authors’ estimates  





  All   Agro & Food  Consumer   Industrials  Other  
  Manufacturing  Industry  Products
    Appendix 3: Number of Listed Manufacturing Firms Classified by Types of Returns to Scales and the SET’s Manufacturing Sectors 
 Source: Authors’ estimates 
     Sectors* 
Year  DRS  %  IRS  %  CRS  %  DRS  %  IRS %  CRS  %  DRS %  IRS %  CRS  %  DRS %  IRS  %  CRS  % DRS  %  IRS %  CRS % 
2000  100  73%  33  24% 4  3%  30  81% 7  19% 0  0% 23  77% 6  20%  1  3% 22  59% 13  35% 2  5% 25  76% 7  21%  1  3% 
2001  109  81%  23  17% 3  2%  35  95% 2  5% 0  0% 24  86% 4  14%  0  0% 23  64% 11  31% 2  6% 27  79% 6  18%  1  3% 
2002  115  85%  18  13% 3  2%  36  97% 0  0% 1  3% 25  89% 3  11%  0  0% 27  71% 9  24% 2  5% 27  82% 6  18%  0  0% 
2003  114  83%  18  13% 5  4%  32  97% 0  0% 1  3% 25  93% 1  4%  1  4% 29  73% 9  23% 2  5% 28  80% 6  17%  1  3% 
2004  139  95%  5  3% 2  1%  35  100% 0  0% 0  0% 27  100% 0  0%  0  0% 41  89% 3  7% 2  4% 36  95% 2  5%  0  0% 
2005  138  91%  12  8% 2  1%  35  97% 1  3% 0  0% 27  100% 0  0%  0  0% 40  82% 7  14% 2  4% 36  90% 4  10%  0  0% 
2006  140  89%  15  10% 2  1%  35  97% 1  3% 0  0% 28  97% 1  3%  0  0% 40  78% 9  18% 2  4% 37  90% 4  10%  0  0% 
2007  141  91%  12  8% 2  1%  35  100% 0  0% 0  0% 27  96% 1  4%  0  0% 41  82% 8  16% 1  2% 38  90% 3  7%  1  2% 
2008  135  88%  14  9% 5  3%  35  100% 0  0% 0  0% 26  93% 2  7%  0  0% 37  74% 9  18% 4  8% 37  90% 3  7%  1  2% 
Note: DRS is decreasing returns to scale; IRS is increasing returns to Scale; CRS is constant returns to scale; *includes Publishing, Construction Materials, and Technology (Computer 
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